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Available online 24 July 2006Knowing what is going to happen next, that is, the capacity to predict
upcoming events, modulates the extent to which aversive stimuli induce
stress and anxiety. We explored this issue by manipulating the temporal
predictability of aversive events by means of a visual cue, which was
either correlated or uncorrelated with pain stimuli (electric shocks).
Subjects reported lower levels of anxiety, negative valence and pain
intensity when shocks were predictable. In addition to attenuate focus
on danger, predictability allows for correct temporal estimation of, and
selective attention to, the sensory input. With functional magnetic
resonance imaging, we found that predictability was related to
enhanced activity in relevant sensory-discriminative processing areas,
such as the primary and secondary sensory cortex and posterior insula.
In contrast, the unpredictable more aversive context was correlated to
brain activity in the anterior insula and the orbitofrontal cortex, areas
associated with affective pain processing. This context also prompted
increased activity in the posterior parietal cortex and lateral prefrontal
cortex that we attribute to enhanced alertness and sustained attention
during unpredictability.
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A sensation of pain typically causes emotional distress. Pain
signals a threat to bodily integrity and can be analyzed in
framework of homeostatic mechanisms. It reflects one of several
afferent modes (e.g., itch, tickle, sensual touch, vasomotor flush,
hunger, thirst) that convey information about the state of the body
to the brain, and this information might provide important input to1053-8119/$ - see front matter D 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.05.027
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ness (Craig, 2002). In the present study, we explore the interplay
between pain, affect, and attentional processes in the context of
pain stimuli that are predictable or unpredictable.
The nature of pain is reflected in both sensory-discriminative
and affective components (Melzack and Casey, 1968). The
sensory-discriminative system includes thalamic nuclei that
mediate afferent information to the primary and secondary
sensory cortices (SI and SII, respectively) and the posterior
insula, which provides an interoceptive context as well as an
interface to the affective system (Craig, 2002). The latter includes
the anterior insula as a central structure and in addition the
anterior cingulate and the orbitofrontal cortices (ACC and OFC,
respectively) (Craig, 2002; Rainville, 2002). Singer et al. (2004)
reported an interesting dissociation between these systems.
Whereas both the sensory-discriminative and the affective
systems were activated in a participant receiving actual pain
stimulation, the affective, but not the sensory-discriminative,
system was empathically activated in the participant observing a
signal indicating that an emotionally close partner was receiving
the pain stimulus.
Several lines of evidence suggest that interoceptive systems
and the anterior insula play a central role in the affective system.
First, the anterior insula activity is more closely correlated with
subjective magnitude ratings of temperature than with physical
increases in temperature (Craig, 2002). Second, visceral stimula-
tion through inflation of a balloon in the esophagus results in
insular activation (Aziz et al., 2000). This insular activity, as well
as reported discomfort, is enhanced in a negative emotional
context (Phillips et al., 2003b). Third, the accuracy in judgment of
heartbeat timing is positively correlated with insular activity as
well as with indices of negative emotion, providing support for its
role in interoceptive awareness (Critchley et al., 2004). Fourth,
perception and mapping of bodily states have since James (1894)
and Lange (1922) been regarded as central for emotional
experience (Mesulam and Mufson, 1985; Damasio et al., 2000;
1 Predictability in a precise sense is a property of the phenomenon to be
predicted, while predictive capacity refers to a property of the system tha
attempts to predict. A more complex sequence may not be detected by the
cognitive system even though the sequence contains a structure, that is, is
predictable. The design of the predictable conditions in this study is simple
and the stimuli may readily be predicted. For simplicity, we therefore refe
to predictability as including also the predictive capacity.
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been implicated in studies with emotional manipulations (e.g.,
Phillips et al., 2003a; Carlsson et al., 2004) and specifically
associated with the emotional component of pain (Singer et al.,
2004).
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has also been given a central
position in affective pain processing. This region has a wide
range of functions such as representing the value of reinforcing
and punishing stimuli (Rolls, 2004). The OFC also responds to
breaches in cue–target associations (Nobre et al., 1999), to the
variability in response-reinforcement contingencies (Elliott et al.,
2000) as well as to aversion prediction error signaling (Seymour
et al., 2005). The ventral striatum, which is anatomically and
functionally linked to the OFC (Selemon and Goldman-Rakic,
1985), has been suggested to support prediction-error process-
ing, that is, violations of reward expectations, as well as
attention to temporal structure (Schultz, 2002; Coull et al.,
2004).
The context in which the pain is experienced has previously
been shown to influence pain processing (Rainville et al., 1997;
Petrovic et al., 2002). For example, subjects anticipating painful
stimuli of high intensity report higher anxiety levels in
anticipation of the stimulus, and higher pain intensity ratings
at stimulus impact, compared to when they anticipate a stimulus
of low intensity, even if the intensity in fact was constant
(Ploghaus et al., 2001). Similarly, the threat of an electric
stimulus increases the anxiety levels as well as the pain
reactivity. In contrast to the threat of an electric shock, the
exposure to three consecutive electric stimuli has the opposite
effect: a decrease in pain reactivity is observed (Rhudy and
Meagher, 2000). This reaction to immediate aversive stimuli can
be characterized as a fear response, which mobilizes the
organism to prepare and, if possible, take rapid action to remove
the pain (O¨hman, 2000b). Indeed, fear may be viewed as a
homeostatic ‘‘error signal’’ conveying a threat to bodily integrity
that motivates restoring the homeostatic balance by escaping
from or inhibiting the pain stimulus. Thus, fear mobilizes the
organism to take action here and now, and it has been suggested
that fear and pain can be regarded as mutually inhibiting states,
of which fear has priority when it comes to promoting fight and
flight (Bolles and Fanselow, 1980). Anxiety, on the other hand,
can be characterized as a future-oriented aversive state in the
face of an uncertain and potentially uncontrollable threat
(O¨hman, 2000a). In terms of the homeostatic model, anxiety
will prevail when pain reflects a long-term threat to homeostatic
balance, probably reflected in salient interoceptive activation.
Therefore, anxiety will be the dominating emotion when pain
stimulation is uncontrollable and protracted. In such situations, it
may be more appropriate to increase vigilance, environmental
scanning and arousal, typical reactions observed in conditions of
anxiety, with a consequent increase in pain reactivity (Bolles and
Fanselow, 1980).
Behavioral control is a primary modulator of the impact of
nociceptive input because it provides an avenue for impacting on
the expected consequences of the aversive input (Maier and
Watkins, 1998). Accordingly, numerous studies have demon-
strated that control reduces the subjective experience of stress as
well as the corresponding ratings of pain (Miller, 1980).
Whereas control typically refers to the capability to do
something in order to change a situation, the ability to predict
implies knowledge about the relationship between events in agiven environment1. Similar to control, prediction can modulate
the extent to which aversive stimuli induce stress and anxiety
(Miller, 1981). Predictability offers the possibility to develop a
model of an aversive situation that specifies what can (and
cannot) be expected. As a consequence there is potentially less
surprise and focus on danger in an aversive situation, which in
turn reduces anxiety as well as anticipatory and impact arousal
(Berlyne et al., 1960).
Predictable pain stimuli entail a Pavlovian fear conditioning
contingency in which the predictive cue (whatever its nature)
serves as a conditioned stimulus and the pain stimulus as an
unconditioned stimulus. As a result of this contingency, condi-
tioned fear to the cue should be expected, because it is regularly
followed by the painful unconditioned stimulus. In a functional
perspective (Domjan, 2005) this conditioned fear response will
serve to modulate the impact of the pain stimulus, through active
avoidance if possible, or though the inhibitory effect of fear on pain
(cf., Bolles and Fanselow, 1980) if the situation precludes active
responses. Furthermore, the flip side of providing information
about when the pain is due, is that the absence of the predictive cue
denotes safety (Seligman, 1968). In an unpredictable situation, on
the other hand, there are no designated safe periods, if the temporal
distribution of pain stimuli is programmed to be random. With such
a procedure, conditioning to the context, making the whole
situation aversive, should be expected. In such an aversive
situation, which lacks specific fear-inducing cues and means to
influence the pain stimulus, the resulting emotional state is better
described as anxiety than fear (e.g., O¨hman, 2000a). Moreover, the
emotional states generated in the predictable and unpredictable
situations might have different brain substrates.
Predictable and unpredictable situations engender different
psychological processes in other respects than conditioning. For
example, the conditions for attention deployment are different with
predictable and unpredictable stimuli. In the predictable case,
selective attention can be precisely directed to the external stimuli,
which is likely to result in increased processing in the brain regions
that process the specific sensory input to which attention is directed
(Rees et al., 1997; Carlsson et al., 2000). In the unpredictable
conditions, on the other hand, stimulation cannot be anticipated,
and hence attention cannot be selectively timed to the stimuli to the
same degree as when they are predictable. However, as generating
anxiety, unpredictable conditions are likely to induce a bias for
detecting threat (e.g., Mogg and Bradley, 1998), which might
activate brain circuits for sustained attention (Pardo et al., 1991).
Predictability can be differentiated in at least two types. The
first involves knowing the conditions under which the event will
occur (contingency predictability), and the second knowing what
the event will be like (what-kind-of-event-predictability) (Miller,
1981). In the present study, the subjects were well acquainted with
the nature and location of the stimuli through a procedure of
choosing appropriate intensity levels. We designed experiments in
which we varied the intensity and the temporal predictability of
brief electric shocks. In a pilot experiment, the electrical shockst
,
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experiment of the present study, shocks were preceded by a visual
cue in the predictable conditions, and in the unpredictable
conditions the cue and the shocks were randomly related. In other
words, we manipulated the degree of contingency predictability of
a somatosensory stimulus of high or low intensity.
The subjects received the same amount of nociceptive input in
the predictable and unpredictable conditions, with the difference
that they either could or could not predict when to expect the
shocks. The primary aim of this functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) study was to delineate functional neuroanatomical
systems related to sensory-discriminative and affective aspects of
pain as modulated by predictability and related contexts of anxiety,
fear conditioning and attention. For the majority of the subjects, we
expected the unpredictability of aversive events to result in an
increase in subjective anxiety experience and negative valence with
corresponding activity in affective neural processing areas such as
the anterior insula and the OFC. We hypothesized predictability, on
the other hand, to allow for direction of selective attention and to
correlate with increased activity in areas supporting sensory-discri-
minatory processes, such as the SI, SII and the posterior insula.Materials and methods
Participants
Ten healthy subjects (3 F/7 M, right handed, non-smoking,
mean age 24 years, range 21–34 years) participated in the pilot
study. In the main experiment, thirteen healthy subjects participat-
ed. Four of these subjects made ratings that were inconsistent
between series and were excluded from further analysis. The
remaining nine subjects (5 F/4 M, right handed, non-smoking,
mean age 25 years, range 21–32 years) were included in the
statistical analysis of the behavioral and functional imaging data.
All subjects gave their informed consent, and the procedures were
approved by the local ethical committee at the Karolinska Hospital.
Nociceptive stimulus delivery and subjective rating
The experimental protocol for both the pilot and main
experiment was defined as a multi-session blocked fMRI paradigm
with four sessions, each consisting of four main conditions. Before
entering the scanner, the subjects chose two levels of a 70-ms
electrical shock stimulation. The shocks were delivered via surface
ECG electrodes placed with approximately 4-cm distance from one
another on the palmar aspect of the right wrist. Both levels, high
(HI) and low (LO), were set in co-operation with the subject. They
were instructed to choose the high level so that it was painful and
of maximum intensity of what they accepted to endure but clearly
within the limit of what would make the participation in the
experiment an acceptable experience. The low level (LO) was set
so that they without doubt could detect the stimulus but as low as
possible. They were told that they could adjust the levels between
any of the four sessions. The power supply for the electric
stimulation was located outside the camera room. To minimize
interference with the scanner, the electrical current applied to the
subject was filtered with a low-pass filter. In both the pilot and
main experiment, the subjects performed ratings between each of
the four scanning sessions. They rated experienced valence,
intensity and anxiety associated with each condition. Zero equaledno unpleasantness/pain intensity/anxiety and 100 equaled the
highest imaginable unpleasantness/pain intensity/anxiety. This
rating procedure was done orally via an intercom system.
Pilot experiment
The subjects watched a screen from a supine position in the
camera via a binocular. They were asked to pay attention to the
visual instructions presented on the screen, to try to fix their gaze in
the center of the screen and at no time during the sessions close
their eyes more than for normal blinking. Somatosensory
stimulations were delivered in 20-s blocks, each containing 10
stimuli. In between each block, there were 10 s of rest. Information
about the upcoming blocks of stimuli and rest was shown for 2 s,
which made the actual period between the somatosensory
stimulations 14 s. A fixation cross was shown at all times except
during the instructions. The instructions contained information
whether the somatosensory stimuli in the upcoming block were to
be of HI or LO intensity and whether they would be delivered in a
rhythmic (RHY) or randomized (RA) way. The rhythmic stimuli
were programmed to come every 2 s, and the randomized stimuli
came in a pseudorandomized fashion every 2 s with a 1.8 s jitter.
The subjects were uninformed about the interstimulus interval. The
subjects completed four sessions containing three blocks of each of
the four conditions RA_HI, RA_LO, RHY_HI, and RHY_LO.
Main experiment
In the same basic setup as for the pilot experiment, the
instructions were shown for 2 s, and there were 4 s of rest in
between each 30 s train of stimuli, making the actual resting period
between the blocks of shocks 8 s (Fig. 2). Each block of stimuli
consisted of 6 shocks and 6 colored squares in a pseudorandomized
sequence (every 4 s T 1.8 s). Instructions displayed on the screen
contained information of whether an upcoming train of stimuli was
to be of HI or LO intensity and whether the somatosensory stimuli
would be uncorrelated (U) or preceded by and thus correlated (C)
to a 0.5-s visual cue. In the C conditions, the shock immediately
followed the visual cue. The visual cue consisted of a 20-cm color
square, either green for the correlated blocks or blue for the
uncorrelated blocks. A fixation cross was displayed at the times
between instructions/squares. Subjects completed four sessions,
each containing three blocks of the four active conditions C_HI,
C_LO, U_HI and U_LO. Specific sequences did recur over
sessions so that a sequence structure was repeated four times for
each subject, however, all twelve of the sequence structures within
a session was unique. Also, the order in which the conditions were
presented was balanced between sessions and subjects.
All behavioral data were statistically tested with analyses of var-
iance (ANOVAs), in which predictability (rhythm for pilot, and corre-
lation to visual cue for main experiment) and level of intensity served
as factors in 2 2 factorial designs. Tukey’s honestly difference (HSD)
tests were used as follow-up test when interac-tions were significant.
fMRI data acquisition
Imaging was performed on a 1.5-T GE Signa Echospeed MR
scanner with a standard circular head coil. Foam pads was used to
help subject to prevent head movements. Functional images were
obtained with a gradient echo-EPI sequence (repetition time, 4.2 s;
echo time, 40 ms; flip angle, 90-; voxel size 3.5  3.5  3.0 mm;
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session was 7 min long and contained 100 volumes. In the main
experiment, the sessions were 7 min 36 sec long containing 108
volumes. Stimulus presentation was synchronized by means of
using a trigger pulse for each image acquisition from the MR
scanner. There were technical problems with this synchronization
during two of the sessions for one subject and one session for
another subject, and these sessions were hence excluded from the
analysis of the data. To reduce magnetic saturation effects, each
session began with three dummy scans that were discarded in the
statistical analysis.
Image preprocessing and statistical analysis
All image processing and statistical analysis was performed using
SPM2 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/spm2.html). First all images for
each subject were realigned to the first scan of the first session,
corrected for movement-by-susceptibility distortion interactions
(Andersson et al., 2001) and re-sampled using a spline-interpolation
kernel. A slice timing correction was performed to the model slice to
correct for the sequential sampling of the brain in the slice direction.
Spatial normalization was based on finding the warping parameters
between the mean EPI volume of a given subject and the SPM2 EPI
template, an approximate Talairach space (Talairach and Tournous,
1988; Ashburner and Friston, 1999), and applying these parameters to
all the individual EPI images. Finally, the images were spatially
smoothed using a 12-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.
Statistical modeling was done using the general linear model
(Friston et al., 1995). Each trial-type was modeled as a box-car
stimulus function convolved with a canonical hemodynamic
response function (HRF) and its temporal derivative. There were
four trial-types of interest (correlated high intensity (C_HI),
correlated low intensity (C_LO), uncorrelated high intensity
(U_HI) and uncorrelated low intensity (U_LO)) and six trial types
of no interest (rest periods and instruction periods preceding the
different trial types of interest). High-pass filtering was performed
with a cut-off frequency of 252 s. Serial autocorrelations were
assumed to conform to an AR(1) model, estimated from the
residuals using a restricted maximum likelihood algorithm (Har-
ville, 1977; Friston et al., 2002) and corrected for using pre-
whitening based on the estimated parameters.
Linear contrasts were used to generate one image per contrast
and subject and subsequently subjected to a second-level random
effects analysis through a one sample t test summary statistic
(Holmes and Friston, 1998). A parametric empirical Bayes
approach was used to generate conditional (on the data) parameter
estimate maps where each value represented the mode of the
posterior distribution of the population effect for that specific
contrast (Friston et al., 2002). A shrinkage prior with a zero mean
and a standard deviation pooled across all voxels was estimated
from the same data. These maps were thresholded so that p(beta >
0|y) > 0.975, meaning that only voxels where the 95% confidence
interval did not include zero were considered.Fig. 1. Graphs depicting the mean T standard error of the mean of the
ratings of anxiety, negative valence, and pain intensity in the main and the
pilot experiment.Results
Behavioral results
In the pilot experiment, where predictability was based on
rhythmicity, the ten subjects rated anxiety, F(1,9) = 24.84, P <0.001, negative valence, F(1,9) = 22.19, P < 0.01 and pain
intensity, F(1,9) = 9.88, P < 0.05 higher for the unpredictable,
randomly presented shocks. The interactions between predictability
(RHY/RA) and level (HI/LO) in anxiety F(1,9) = 49.43, P <
0.0001, negative valence F(1,9) = 28.79, P < 0.001 and intensity
F(1,9) = 5.70 P < 0.05 indicated significantly higher effects of
rhythmicity in the HI compared to the LO level of stimulation.
Tukey’s HSD test showed an effect for rhythmicity in the HI level
of stimulation, P < 0.001 for anxiety, P < 0.001 for negative
valence and P < 0.01 for intensity (see Fig. 1).
In the main experiment, four subjects made ratings that were
inconsistent between series and were excluded from further
analysis. The pattern of variation was different between subjects,
and no trend over time was detectable that suggested that, i.e.,
learning was part of this variability. The remaining nine subjects
rated anxiety F(1,8) = 23.83, P < 0.01 and negative valence
F(1,8) = 53.08, P < 0.0001 significantly higher for the U
condition compared to the C condition. No difference in ratings
between the two conditions regarding intensity was found. There
was also an interaction in reported anxiety F(1,8) = 20.76, P < 0.01
and negative valence F(1,8) = 177.73, P < 0.00001 between
temporal predictability (U/C) and stimulus level (HI/LO) with a
larger increase during HI than LO stimulus intensity. Tukey’s HSD
test showed an effect for predictability in the HI level of
stimulation, P < 0.001, for anxiety and negative valence (see
Fig. 1).
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The pilot experiment did not yield any differences between the
studied conditions. Hence, only data from the main experiment are
reported (see Table 1 and Fig. 2).
HI vs. LO
The main effect comparing the high vs. low intensities of the
somatosensory stimulation revealed in essence the classical pain
matrix (Ingvar, 1999). Activations included the left SI and the
bilateral SII, almost all of the ACC from the rostral to the caudal part,
the anterior and posterior insula, the periaqueductal gray (PAG), the
cerebellum and the visual cortex. The medial OFC was the only
active area in the reversed contrast, LO vs. HI (see Table 1G and H).
U vs. C
Unpredictability (main effect) leads to activations in the right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and premotor areas, the
right and left posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and the right inferior
parietal cortex (IPC) together with the bilateral anterior insula and
the right lateral OFC (see Fig. 2, Table 1A).
U_HI vs. C_HI
The pattern of activation was with some variations, similar in
the simple main effects of U_HI vs. C_HI and U_LO vs. C_LO. In
U_HI vs. C_HI, the anterior insula activation was confined to the
left side and extended into the ventral striatum. The right lateral
OFC was activated, but the right fronto-parietal network did not
show significant activation in this contrast. Bilateral premotor
areas, a left PPC/visual cortex area (BA 19/40) and a caudal ACC
area were active (see Fig. 2, Table 1C).
U_LO vs. C_LO
In the non-painful conditions unpredictability activated the
anterior insula, limited to the right side, the right DLPFC and PPC
(see Table 1E).
C vs. U
Allowing for prediction lead to activations the left SI, the SII
and posterior insula, both regions bilaterally, the right hippocampus
region and the left amygdala region, and the visual cortex (see Fig.
2, Table 1B).
C_HI vs. U_HI
In the correlated and painful condition, there were activations
bilaterally in the posterior insula, and unilaterally in the left visual
cortex, the left OFC and in the left hippocampus region (see Table 1D).
C_LO vs. U_LO
In the corresponding contrast for the low intensity stimulations,
the left SI, and bilaterally in the SII, the hippocampus region and
the visual cortex were activated (see Table 1F).
Probing for interactions between factors stimulus intensity 
predictability revealed no significant differences.Discussion
This study was designed to examine cerebral mechanisms
underlying the experience of aversive stimuli as altered bypredictability. Compared to a condition in which pain stimuli were
predictable by means of a visual cue, unpredictable pain stimuli
resulted in increased ratings of anxiety and negative valence. The
corresponding comparison of the fMRI data showed activations of
structures belonging to the affective pain network, including the
anterior insula and the lateral OFC. The unpredictable condition
required sustained attention, and activity increases were thus noted
in the fronto-parietal attentional network. The ventral striatum was
also activated in response to the unpredictable aversive events.
Predictability of pain stimuli, on the other hand, allows for a more
detailed sensory discriminatory processing. Accordingly, activity
in the SI and SII and posterior insula was increased. In addition, the
anterior medial temporal lobe (amygdala/hippocampal complex)
and the visual cortex were more active in the predictable compared
to the unpredictable condition.
The visual signal in the C conditions provided a cue that
allowed for correct direction of attentional focus in time and space.
It is known that attentional direction towards a stimulus generates
faster reaction times (Posner et al., 1980) and an increased neural
response in relevant processing areas (Rees et al., 1997; Shulman
et al., 1997; Rees and Frith, 1998; Carlsson et al., 2000). The
prepared state offered in the C conditions and the resulting
selective attention lead to focused processing of the sensory-
discriminative aspect of the stimuli as reflected in increased
activity in the posterior insula, the SI and the SII. While the SI and
SII has been described as to provide discriminative aspects of
exteroceptive information, the posterior insula has been hypothe-
sized to provide that of interoceptive information, all three regions
being arranged topographically (Craig, 2002; Bingel et al., 2003).
Small-diameter afferent fibers code for physiological status of
various tissues of the body. These fibers terminate on neurons in
lamina I in the spinal cord, which in turn project to homeostatic
sites in the brainstem and the PAG. The neurons also follow a
pathway to the posterior insular cortex and area 3a. In the posterior
insula, a topographic modality-selective (pain, temperature, itch,
hunger, cardiovascular activity etc.) representation of the intero-
ceptive afferent activity of lamina I is provided. It is this cortical
image of interoceptive information in the posterior insula that has
been hypothesized to provide discriminative aspects of the pain
stimulus (Craig, 2002; Bingel et al., 2003). This conception of pain
afference also goes beyond a secluded somatosensory system
representation to a specific sensation conveyed by multiple distinct
sensory channels.
The electrical stimulus used in this study activates a multitude
of sensory afferents (Devor and Seltzer, 1999), which may mean
that the detected SI and SII activations should be attributed to
general somatosensory rather than to specific pain processing. As
the afferent projections to the SI and SII also are arranged
topographically, these areas, like the posterior insula, process the
discriminative aspects of somatosensory information, but as
mentioned, mainly related to exteroceptive information (Craig,
2002).
In addition to directing attention towards a specific external
event at a specific time, predictability allows for the structuring a
time period into episodes when there is actual danger and other
episodes when aversive events are likely not to occur, that is, when
one is safe (Seligman, 1968). The response to an external
immediate aversive event can be conceptualized as related to a
state of fear that mobilizes the organism to take action here and
now. The priority of fear over pain to promote fight and flight
involves the inhibition of pain (Bolles and Fanselow, 1980).
Table 1
Local activation maxima
Region BA CI Beta x, y, z
A. Uncorrelated versus correlated (U vs. C)
OFC BA 10 0.0361–0.2657 0.1509 26, 48, 4
Anterior insula 0.0263–0.2568 0.1415 36, 24, 2
Anterior insula 0.0515–0.2800 0.1658 30, 18, 6
Premotor cortex BA 6/8 0.0664–0.2881 0.1773 28, 20, 64
BA 6/8 0.0443–0.3164 0.1804 34, 8, 58
DLPFC BA 9/45 0.0377–0.2965 0.1671 52, 18, 48
BA 45 0.0177–0.2628 0.1403 58, 18, 16
BA 9 0.0319–0.2868 0.1593 42, 12, 22
PPC BA 40 0.0418–0.2594 0.1506 30, 54, 40
BA 40 0.0393–0.2945 0.1669 46, 48, 50
IPC BA 42 0.0248–0.3204 0.1726 58, 54, 18
Cerebellum 0.0668–0.2902 0.1785 42, 52, 44
B. Correlated versus uncorrelated (C vs. U)
Medial frontal lobe BA 10 0.0714–0.3349 0.2031 6, 52, 2
Posterior insula 0.0475–0.2976 0.1726 38, 22, 4
Posterior insula 0.0128–0.2648 0.1388 40, 16, 6
SII BA 40/43 0.0220–0.2869 0.1544 54, 14, 14
SII BA 40/43 0.0155–0.2451 0.1303 50, 20, 18
SI BA 1/3 0.0347–0.2697 0.1522 48, 24, 62
SI BA 1/3 0.0003–0.2560 0.1282 54, 36, 56
Hippocampus region 0.0500–0.2791 0.1648 36, 18, 20
Amygdala region 0.0255–0.2589 0.1402 22, 10, 18
Visual cortex BA 18 0.1350–0.3906 0.2628 6, 86, 20
Cerebellum 0.0963–0.4023 0.2493 6, 48, 8
C. Uncorrelated high versus correlated high (U_HI vs. C_HI)
OFC BA 10/47 0.0244–0.1799 0.1021 26, 46, 4
Anterior insula 0.0108–0.1697 0.0903 30, 26, 10
Putamen/insula 0.0406–0.1976 0.1191 30, 10, 0
Premotor area BA 6/8 0.0662–0.2302 0.1482 36, 10, 60
Premotor area BA 6 0.0542–0.2111 0.1326 24, 16, 76
Caudal ACC BA 31 0.0058–0.1675 0.0866 12, 12, 54
PCC BA 23/31 0.0108–0.1693 0.0900 4, 26, 60
PPC/visual cortex BA 19/40 0.0578–0.2150 0.1364 40, 80, 40
Pons 0.0064–0.1749 0.0907 8, 18, 28
D. Correlated high versus uncorrelated high (C_HI vs. U_HI)
OFC BA 10/11 0.0158–0.1985 0.1072 36, 56, 8
OFC BA 47 0.0121–0.1818 0.0970 50, 46, 10
Posterior insula 0.0544–0.2136 0.1340 42, 2, 14
Posterior insula 0.0357–0.1981 0.1169 44, 6, 12
Posterior insula 0.0090–0.1744 0.0917 44, 14, 6
Posterior insula 0.0129–0.1821 0.0975 44, 22, 10
Hippocampus region 0.0164–0.1744 0.0954 16, 14, 20
Visual cortex BA 17/18 0.0050–0.1783 0.0917 12, 80, 14
Visual cortex BA 19 0.0090–0.1690 0.0849 28, 64, 8
Cerebellum 0.0566–0.2280 0.1423 10, 48, 12
E. Uncorrelated low versus correlated low (U_LO vs. C_LO)
DLPFC BA 8–9 0.0188–0.1631 0.0910 50, 14, 52
DLPFC BA44/45 0.0155–0.1655 0.0905 42, 10, 24
DLPFC BA 6/8 0.0153–0.1640 0.0897 22, 20, 60
DLPFC BA 6/8 0.0067–0.1626 0.0847 44, 6, 40
Anterior insula 0.0247–0.1628 0.0937 32, 22, 2
PPC BA 7 0.0284–0.1722 0.1003 48, 54, 58
PPC BA 7 0.0238–0.1686 0.0962 38, 52, 50
Cerebellum 0.0013–0.1416 0.0714 40, 52, 46
F. Correlated low versus uncorrelated low (C_LO vs. U_LO)
Medial frontal lobe BA 9/10 0.0105–0.1555 0.0830 10, 48, 0
Premotor area BA 6 0.0529–0.1885 0.1207 60, 0, 26
(continued on next page)
K. Carlsson et al. / NeuroImage 32 (2006) 1804–1814 1809
Region BA CI Beta x, y, z
Premotor area BA 6 0.0529–0.1916 0.1233 60, 6, 24
SII BA 43 0.0144–0.1621 0.0868 52, 10, 16
SII 0.0212–0.1696 0.0954 64, 20, 30
SI/MI BA 1/4 0.0359–0.1742 0.1050 52, 22, 56
SI/MI BA 1/4 0.0215–0.1630 0.0922 34, 24, 34
SI/MI BA 1/4 0.0115–0.1553 0.0834 38, 26, 60
SI/MI BA 1/4 0.0039–0.1511 0.0774 40, 16, 52
Visual cortex BA 18 0.0277–0.1727 0.1002 10, 100, 22
Visual cortex BA 18 0.0008–0.1649 0.0829 10, 82, 22
Hippocampus region 0.0046–0.1480 0.0763 28, 14, 20
Hippocampus region 0.0143–0.1610 0.0876 38, 16, 18
Cerebellum 0.0062–0.1578 0.0820 10, 52, 20
G. High versus low (HI vs. LO)
OFC BA 47/11 0.1217–0.4796 0.3006 34, 24, 12
OFC BA 47 0.1539–0.4973 0.3256 34, 18, 16
Rostral ACC BA 32 0.2288–0.5971 0.4130 2, 52, 12
Rostral ACC BA 32 0.2152–0.6203 0.4178 2, 38, 20
Dorsal ACC BA 32 0.0295–0.4638 0.2466 8, 16, 40
Dorsal ACC BA 32 0.0590–0.4413 0.2501 8, 6, 40
Caudal ACC BA 31 0.1887–0.5358 0.3623 10, 0, 42
Caudal ACC BA 31 0.2156–0.5373 0.3764 10, 16, 44
Insula/frontal operculum 0.2613–0.6548 0.4581 50, 26, 6
Insula/frontal operculum 0.1777–0.4844 0.3310 50, 30, 0
Anterior insula 0.1021–0.4496 0.2758 36, 12, 6
Anterior insula 0.1150–0.4639 0.2895 34, 10, 4
Posterior insula 0.0448–0.3829 0.2139 46, 16, 0
Posterior insula 0.1707–0.4934 0.3321 40, 18, 6
SII BA 40 0.0747–0.4186 0.2466 42, 22, 20
SII BA 40 0.1927–0.5309 0.3618 42, 26, 24
SI BA 1/3 0.1250–0.5530 0.3390 28, 30, 64
SI BA 1/3 0.0405–0.5078 0.2742 42, 26, 66
PAG 0.0639–0.4149 0.2389 6, 32, 28
PAG 0.0868–0.4878 0.2873 10, 24, 10
Visual cortex 0.1283–0.5263 0.3273 2, 86, 10
Cerebellum 0.1092–0.5046 0.3069 14, 58, 20
Cerebellum 0.1239–0.5559 0.3399 16, 46, 18
0.1656–0.5222 0.3439 10, 64, 44
H. Low versus High (LO vs. HI)
OFC BA 11 0.1615–0.4743 0.3179 16, 42, 20
OFC BA 11 0.1727–0.5409 0.3568 18, 48, 18
Note. The x, y, z coordinates refer to the standard space of the EPI template as implemented in SPM2 (an approximate Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux,
1988)). BA = Brodmann area; SII = secondary somatosensory cortex; SI = primary somatosensory cortex; OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; DLPFC = dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex; PPC = posterior parietal cortex; IPC = inferior parietal cortex; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex, PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; MI =
primary motor area; MTL = medial temporal lobe; PAG = periaqueductal gray.
Table 1 (continued)
K. Carlsson et al. / NeuroImage 32 (2006) 1804–18141810Unpredictability, on the other hand, leads to anxiety and increased
environmental and somatic scanning that facilitates sensory
receptivity (cf. Rhudy and Meagher, 2000) and increases the
painful experience. Our experimental paradigm was not primarily
designed to delineate the differences between fear and anxiety.
However, we speculate that the electric shock following the visual
cue in the C conditions with certainty leads to relatively more
specifically timed fear compared to the U conditions, whose
unpredictable shocks generated more anxiety (Walker et al., 2003).
Indeed, the correlated conditions not only resulted in lower
anxiety ratings, but they also fulfilled requirements for a fear
conditioning paradigm in which the visual cue (the green square)
reliably predicted a potentially painful shock in the high stimulus
intensity condition. Furthermore, the unpredictable U condition can
be viewed as a stringent control condition for assessing associativeeffects of conditioning, because it presented visual (the blue
square) and somatosensory stimuli randomly (Rescorla, 1967).
Thus, areas that were more active during the C than the U
condition may reflect associative changes as a result of Pavlovian
conditioning. The role of amygdala in fear conditioning has been
well documented in lesion studies of both animals (Davis, 1994;
LeDoux, 2000) and humans (LaBar et al., 1995), as well as in
human functional imaging experiments (e.g., LaBar et al., 1998;
Morris et al., 2001; Buchel and Dolan, 2000). As expected from
this perspective, in our study, the amygdala was more active in the
correlated as opposed to the uncorrelated conditions. Fear
conditioning work with rats shows that the conditioned defense
response (e.g., freezing) may include analgesia as preparation for a
painful unconditioned stimulus (Bolles and Fanselow, 1980;
Fanselow and Helmstetter, 1988). That is, the increased activity
Fig. 2. Top: Experimental design for the main experiment showing the random presentation of visual cues (green (grey bars) and blue (black bars) squares,
duration 0.5 s) and somatosensory stimuli (70 ms). In the correlated (C) conditions, the green visual cues preceded the somatosensory stimuli, while the visual
and somatosensory stimuli were uncorrelated in the U condition. The instructions were shown for 2 s, and there were 4 s of rest in between each 30-s train of
stimuli. Four sessions of 8 min each contained three blocks of the four active conditions Correlated High (C_HI), Correlated Low (C_LO), Uncorrelated High
(U_HI) and Uncorrelated Low (U_LO). (Upper row) Primary sensory cortex (z = 62), secondary sensory cortex (z = 14) and posterior insula (z = 4) in C vs.
U. (Lower left) Left amygdala ( y = 6, x = 20) in C vs. U. (Lower middle) Left anterior insula and putamen and right orbitofrontal cortex (z = 0) in U_HI vs.
C_HI. (Lower right) Posterior parietal cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (x = 48) in U vs. C. CI = 90% for illustrative purposes.
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may be part of a process that dampens the impact of the
somatosensory stimuli, thus resulting in decreased ratings of pain
and anxiety. The projections of the central nucleus of amygdala to
the lateral hypothalamus and the PAG give the amygdala a
possibility to modulate autonomic changes, behavioral fear
responses as well as analgesia. It is therefore possible that the
involvement of amygdala in this type of conditioning may, in
addition to play a key role in the associative learning about
emotionally salient information, also be part of the down-
regulating of physiological reactions intrinsic to the improved
coping that was possible in the predictable conditions.
The higher anxiety and negative valence ratings during the U
conditions activated areas related to affective processing; the
anterior insula, the OFC and the ACC (U_HI vs. C_HI). In addition
to the sensory-discriminative component, pain processing also
contains an affective, motivational aspect (Craig, 2002). The
cortical image based on interoceptive information represented in
the posterior insula is re-represented in the middle and anterior
insula (Craig, 2003). Whereas the posterior insula has been
hypothesized to provide the sensory-discriminative aspects of the
pain stimulus, the anterior insula with its strong anatomical
connections to, for example, the amygdala and the adjacent lateralOFC, is more important in the affective and autonomic components
of pain (Craig, 2002; Bingel et al., 2003). The anterior insula has
consistently been activated in studies with emotional manipulations
(Phillips et al., 2003a; Carlsson et al., 2004) and specifically
associated with the emotional component of pain (Singer et al.,
2004). For example, knowing that a loved one experienced pain
was sufficient to activate the anterior insula, while activity in the
posterior insula was specific to receiving pain (Singer et al., 2004).
Functional imaging studies have also provided evidence for the
role of the anterior insula in creating a map of the bodily autonomic
state (Aziz et al., 2000; Critchley et al., 2004). Thus, the anterior
insula is involved in both the mapping of bodily and affective
states, two phenomena hypothesized already by James (1894) and
Lange (1922) to be closely interlinked. This is consistent with the
co-occurrence of the reported higher level of anxiety/negative
valence and the anterior insula activity during the U conditions as
well as with the conceptualization of pain as a bodily feeling with
an inherent association with emotion.
The caudal ACC coordinate of the activation maximum in the
unpredictable painful condition (U_HI vs. C_HI) was in a dorsal
location (z = 54). Some atlases claim that the caudal ACC reaches
upwards and includes also this region (Greitz et al., 1991) while in
other atlases this location would fall into the supplementary motor
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caudal ACC, may be regarded as somewhat speculative, although it
is consistent with the association of this region’s with the affective
tone of pain processing (Vogt and Pandya, 1987; Buchel et al.,
2002).
As the OFC is a key structure in processing reward and aversive
information (Schultz et al., 2000; Rolls, 2004), the activation we
observed in the U conditions in the lateral OFC can be
conceptualized as associated to the more aversive and disturbing
unpredictable pain. Another possible interpretation of the role of
the OFC in this condition is related to this region’s implication in
behavioral flexibility and withholding prepared responses (Elliott
et al., 2000). For instance, Nobre et al. (1999) reported a
corresponding OFC activation in conditions when cues carried
invalid predictive information, that is, when expectancies failed,
and Seymour et al. (2005) recently reported an activation in the
lateral OFC in response to an aversive prediction error signal.
Identifying patterns and making temporal estimation of stimuli
arrival are important components in the anticipation of upcoming
events; a key signal being the prediction error in the estimate. A
change in sequencing, that is, a violation of expectation, has
previously been related to activity in the ventral striatum (Berns et
al., 1997; Pagnoni et al., 2002; Schultz, 2002; Seymour et al.,
2004; Forkstam and Petersson, 2005). In line with this, we attribute
the activation in the ventral striatum during the U conditions, to
attempt to develop a model that would make the pain stimuli more
predictable by recruiting areas responsible for learning about
temporal cues.
It has been argued that attentional focus and anxiety usually are
confounded in studies of effect of anxiety on pain and that it is the
attentional focus and not the anxiety that actually lead to increased
pain experience (Arntz et al., 1994). We suggest that our study
design provided a distinction between anxiety and sustained
attention on the one hand and selective attention on the other.
Unpredictable aversiveness in the U conditions prompted sustained
attention and anxiety, whereas predictability in the C conditions
allowed for less focusing on danger and more selective attention
towards somatosensory-discriminative processing as reflected in
the increased activity in the posterior insula, the SI and the SII.
Sustained attention, relying on both arousal and attention over a
period of time, has consistently been associated with activation in a
frontal–parietal network, predominantly in the right hemisphere
(Pardo et al., 1991; Coull, 1998; Carlsson et al., 2000), a network
that was activated to a higher degree in the U conditions.
One other effect of the predictability offered by the visual cue
was that the green visual stimulus, which reliably predicted the
electric shocks, activated the visual cortex to a higher degree than
the blue visual stimulus, in spite of the similar amount of visual
input. While the blue square did not carry any such meaning, the
green square predicted a motivationally relevant stimulus, and we
interpret the increased visual processing in the C condition to
reflect that association with relative significance.
The general idea of this study was to address the question if
there is a difference in processing of incoming stimuli under a state
of prior knowledge of predictability compared to that of
unpredictability. As we wanted to mirror state effects rather than
the effects of single events, we used a block design. One limitation
of the data in this study is that four out of thirteen subjects in the
main experiment rated inconsistently between series and was
excluded from further analysis. In the pilot experiment in which the
interstimulus interval was shorter and predictability was varied bymeans of comparing random and non-random (i.e., with constant
interstimulus intervals) presentation of the stimuli, all subjects
rated the predictable conditions as less painful, less intense and less
anxiety provoking. Because these differences in subjective
experiences were not well reflected in the fMRI data, probably
due to insufficient sensitivity to rapid trains of stimuli (saturation
effects), we decided to make the stimulus presentation interval
longer. However, longer presentation intervals make it more
difficult exactly to predict the coming event by means of the
rhythm. Therefore, in the main experiment, we varied the
predictability through the introduction of a visual cue that either
preceded each of the sensory stimuli with 0.5 s or was shown at
random time points during the stimulation period. Even though the
behavioral results in these two experiments were similar, the main
experiment did not yield as clear results as the pilot experiment.
Several factors seem to have effect on preferences regarding
predictability, such as context, anticipatory intervals, the nature of
the aversive events, as well as individual differences (Miller,
1981). These factors will affect the strategies to handle the aversive
events; two of the strategies referred to as blunting and monitoring
(Miller, 1981). Blunting entails cognitive avoidance or transfor-
mation of threat relevant information, in which case predictive cues
are felt as disturbing and as enhancing anxiety. The monitoring
strategy, on the other hand, involves attending to predictive cues,
and this may reduce anxiety by defining safe periods or facilitating
habituation to the aversive stimulus. Miller (1981) argued that the
monitoring mode will be preferred under conditions where the
aversive events are invasive and of high frequency, and that
blunting will be preferred in situation with the opposite character-
istics (i.e., low-frequent non-invasive conditions). In addition,
individual variability might also be taken into consideration such
that when having a choice, a minority of subjects will choose
unpredictability even under conditions apparently not favoring
distraction. Similarly, a small minority of subjects chooses
predictability under conditions supporting distraction. In this study,
the subjects were placed in the camera with little else to attend to
than to monitor the presentation of visual and somatosensory
stimuli. Stimuli were presented at a relatively high rate and the
anticipatory periods were short. We hypothesized that this
experimental setup would promote a monitoring strategy. The
context in the pilot study with a stimulus presentation rate of 2 s
seemed to support the monitoring mode effectively with lower
stress ratings for the predictable rhythmic conditions in all subjects.
The lower presentation rate of 4 s in the main study may have been
somewhat less supportive of the monitoring mode allowing for
inconsistencies in ratings in some of the subjects.Conclusions
We manipulated the stimulus presentation context in terms of
predictability of aversive somatosensory events while keeping the
input constant. The unpredictable situation induced more anxiety
and correlated increases in the anterior insula, a region which has
been suggested to provide an interface between interoceptive states
and the representation of these states as feelings. This condition
also increased the activity in the right fronto-parietal network,
which we attribute to enhanced alertness and sustained attention
when the aversiveness was unpredictable. Furthermore, we ascribe
the involvement of ventral striatum to an active search for any
possible temporal structure in the delivery of the electric shocks as
K. Carlsson et al. / NeuroImage 32 (2006) 1804–1814 1813well as continuous violations in those expectancies. While the
unpredictable situation induced more anxiety and increased
alertness towards aversiveness, the visual cues in the predictable
conditions allowed for correct estimation of the stimulus arrival.
Selective attention is known to enhance activity in task-relevant
information processing regions. Accordingly, the predictable
sensory events were processed to a higher degree in the
somatosensory areas of the SI, SII and the posterior insulae. We
suggest that the distinct patterns of brain activity in the respective
contexts represent two aspects of pain processing; the affective
component related to the anterior insula and the OFC in the
unpredictable, more aversive condition, and the sensory-discrim-
inative aspect represented by activity in the SI, SII, and the
posterior insulae, during predictability.Acknowledgments
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